Recent malware, like Stuxnet and Flame, constitute a major threat to networked critical infrastructures (NCIs), e.g., power plants. They revealed several vulnerabilities in today's NCIs, but most importantly they highlighted the lack of an efficient scientific approach to conduct experiments that measure the impact of cyber threats on both the physical and the cyber parts of NCIs. In this paper, we present EPIC, a novel cyber-physical testbed, and a modern scientific instrument that can provide accurate assessments of the effects that cyber-attacks may have on the cyber and physical dimensions of NCIs. To meet the complexity of today's NCIs, EPIC employs an Emulab-based testbed to recreate the cyber part of NCIs and multiple software simulators for the physical part. Its main advantage is that it can support very accurate, real-time, repeatable, and realistic experiments with heterogeneous infrastructures. We show through several case studies how EPIC can be applied to explore the impact that cyber-attacks and Information and Communications Technology system disruptions have on critical infrastructures.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the last years we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) within Networked Critical Infrastructures (NCIs), e.g., power plants, water plants and energy smart grids. As a result, it has been possible to construct more cost-efficient and flexible industrial installations as well as introduce new services and features such as remote monitoring and maintenance, energy markets, and the newly emerging smart grid. Although the advantages of this trend are indisputable, this dramatic shift from a completely isolated environment, to a ''system of systems'' integration with existing infrastructures, e.g., the Internet, exposed NCIs to significant cyber threats. This has been highlighted by many studies on Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems [1] , [2] , i.e., the core infrastructure that provides monitoring and control of physical processes, which highlight that NCIs are not only subject to typical IT systems attacks, but also to a new breed of cyber-physical attacks.
Cyber-physical attacks target the cyber and physical dimensions of NCIs and can severely disrupt their normal operation. Stuxnet [3] , the first malware specifically designed to attack NCIs, together with the more recently reported malware called ''Flame'' [4] , are a clear demonstration of this risk. Moreover, they show an increased level of sophistication in malware development. Stuxnet and Flame raised many open questions, but most importantly they highlighted the lack of an efficient scientific approach to conduct experiments that measure the impact of cyber threats against both the physical and the cyber dimensions of NCIs. In other words, we are missing the proper scientific instruments to experimentally assess questions like: what is the effect of Stuxnet on a centrifuge installation?
To address the aforementioned challenges, we present in this paper EPIC: a novel cyber-physical Experimentation Platform for Internet Contingencies. EPIC is a modern scientific instrument that can provide accurate assessments of the impact that cyber-attacks may have on the cyber and physical dimensions of NCIs. To meet the complexity of today's NCIs, EPIC uses an emulation testbed based on Emulab [5] , [6] to recreate the cyber elements of a NCI and software simulators for the physical components. Compared to other testbeds [7] - [10] its main advantage is that it can support very accurate, real-time, repeatable and realistic experiments with heterogeneous infrastructures. This powerful scientific instrument can be used to study multiple interdependent infrastructures and provide insights about the propagation of faults and disruptions. We present several case studies showing how EPIC can be used to explore the impact of cyberattacks and Information and Communications Technology (ICT) system disruptions on physical processes such as power plants, chemical plants, electricity grids and railway systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the motivation for developing a novel testbed, while Section III describes the architecture and implementation of EPIC. The performance of EPIC is evaluated in Section IV. Case studies showing the applicability of EPIC to cyber security studies on small-scale and large-scale infrastructures are presented in Section V. The paper concludes in Section VI.
II. THE NEED FOR NEW SCIENTIFIC INSTRUMENTS
A major limitation of existing testbeds is the inability to run security experiments on multiple heterogeneous NCIs. In fact, today's NCIs are highly interconnected and interdependent which means that a single failure within one NCI might have a cascading effect on others. For example, the collapse of India's northern electricity grid in July 2012 [11] affected more than 600 million people and led to the loss of power in transportation, health care, street lights, and many other. Although this was not a cyber security incident, a similar scenario originating from a cyber-attack is not difficult to imagine. Scenarios such as this one need to be recreated, analyzed and understood in a laboratory environment in order to develop the necessary security measures that can be applied in real settings.
A. TESTBED REQUIREMENTS
A cyber-physical testbed as a modern scientific instrument for the study of multiple interdependent NCIs needs to be compatible and actively support the ''scientific method''. The instrument should actually enable and ease researchers to apply rigorous scientific methods by ensuring the fidelity, repeatability, measurement accuracy, and safe execution of experiments [6] . Furthermore, the testbed should support the execution of complex, large-scale and disruptive experiments with real-world, e.g., industrial, hardware and software.
1) FIDELITY
Experimentation testbeds need to reproduce as accurately as possible the real system under study. However, in many cases reproducing in an absolute way all details of a real system might not be necessary. Therefore it is preferable for an experimental platform to offer an ''adjustable level of realism'', meaning that we can use the level of detail that is sufficient to test the experiment hypothesis. For example one experiment might need to reproduce a network at the very low level using real routers (reproducing even the lower layers of the OSI model, i.e., Layer 1 and 2) while for another experiment the use of a software router might be sufficient (focusing for example on the application layer). The concept of adjustable level of realism is to have the option to use real hardware when it's really needed and emulators, simulators or other abstractions when not.
2) REPEATABILITY
This requirement reflects the need to repeat an experiment and obtain the same or statistically consistent results. Repeatable experiments require a controlled environment, but to achieve them the researcher has to define clearly and in detail the experiment's initial and final state as well as all events in between these two states. To reproduce a previously stored experiment scenario the researcher should be able to setup the experimental platform in the initial state and trigger all necessary events in the right order and time of occurrence.
3) MEASUREMENT ACCURACY
Experiments should be accurately monitored and measurements should not interfere with the experiment because they might alter the experiment's outcome. Therefore separation of control, measurement and experiment processes is needed.
4) SAFE EXECUTION
In most cases security experiments assume the presence of an adversary that employs malicious software to reach his/her goals. The effect of this software can be unpredictable and may have disruptive effects on physical systems. For example, an attacker aiming at damaging an installation might close specific valves in a gas pipe to increase the pressure by issuing remote commands to control hardware. Such cases might need to be recreated in experiments, but without jeopardizing the physical testbed itself and without threatening the researchers. Therefore, a security experimentation testbed needs to support disruptive experiments with physical processes in a safe manner.
B. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING APPROACHES
In order to assess the state of the art, we performed a literature review and we evaluated the features of currently available testbeds against the previously defined set of requirements.
In Table 1 we provide a classification of existing testbeds according to their building blocks; each testbed is labeled with the first author's surname. Table 1 clearly shows that a high fidelity of the cyber layer requires real components, including real networks, real software and protocols. However, the use of real components (Fovino [7] ), does not guarantee experiment repeatability and measurement accuracy. For these purposes testbeds need to implement techniques that automate the experimentation workflow, and separate experimental processes from control and monitoring processes. The testbed proposed in this paper (EPIC) guarantees all these requirements by adopting an emulation-based approach, detailed in the following sections.
On the other hand, a fully simulated cyber layer (Queiroz [13] and Nan [8] ) provides strong repeatability and measurement accuracy. However, as shown by recent studies, this induces a weak fidelity for the cyber layer. For example, a study published in 2009 [14] , revealed key differences between the use of simulators and real/emulated components in cyber security experiments. The study focused on TCPtargeted attacks and revealed that simulators abstract a number of system attributes and do not model key components such as drivers, CPUs and buses. In fact, these can become bottlenecks and might have a significant impact on cyberattacks. As shown by the same study, in the particular case of low-rate TCP-targeted DoS attacks, the attack is effective only when real routers and PCs are involved, and seems ineffective when simulators are used.
The mix of real components with simulators in the cyber layer (Chunlei [12] and McDonald [9] ) brings together advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. Unfortunately, in these testbeds the strong fidelity provided by real components is weakened by simulated cyber components.
The classification on physical layer implementations reveals that most testbeds are designed to study one specific CI, i.e., Fovino [7] , Chunlei [12] , McDonald [9] , and Queiroz [13] . The work of Nan [8] tries to fill this gap by recreating a multi-domain environment using an agent-based architecture that interconnects multiple simulators from different domains. Such testbeds might prove effective on interdependency studies, but as already mentioned, they fail to accurately recreate the cyber layer. In contrast, EPIC combines a real ICT testbed with several software simulators to provide strong cyber layer fidelity and experimentation capabilities with multiple heterogeneous NCIs.
A further inspection shows that testbeds employing real physical installations (Fovino [7] , Chunlei [12] and Queiroz [13] ) provide strong fidelity and accurate results. However, security experiments can be highly disruptive and the use of real malware might have unpredictable consequences on physical processes. Moreover, the exploration of the parameter space might require several changes on the physical installation that could be economically unfeasible. Therefore, the strong fidelity of a dedicated experimentation infrastructure is counterbalanced by its poor flexibility, high maintenance costs and a high risk to safety.
III. ARCHITECTURAL DESCRIPTION OF EPIC
The architecture of EPIC suggests the use of an emulation testbed based on the Emulab software [5] , [6] in order to recreate the cyber part of NCIs, e.g., corporate network, and the use of software simulation for the physical components, e.g., a chemical process. Figure 1 (a) provides an overview of EPIC's architecture and experimentation steps, which will be further elaborated in the remaining of this section.
A. EXPERIMENTATION SOFTWARE AND HARDWARE
The use of emulation testbeds in networking research is becoming more popular. One of the most advanced software suites in this direction is Emulab [5] . The name Emulab refers both to a facility at University of Utah and to a software. Nowadays the software is actively supported by multiple universities and there are many private installations throughout the world.
We have developed in our laboratory a testbed using the Emulab architecture and software. By adopting Emulab in EPIC, we can automatically and dynamically map physical components, e.g., servers and switches, to a virtual topology. In other words, the Emulab software configures the physical topology in a way which emulates the virtual topology as transparently as possible. This way we gain significant advantages in terms of repeatability, scalability and controllability of our experiments.
The basic Emulab architecture consists of two control servers, a pool of physical resources that are used as experimental nodes (generic PCs, routers or other devices) and a set of switches that interconnect the nodes. The Emulab software provides a Web interface to proceed with every step of the experiment life cycle within our testbed (see Figure 1(a) ). 1) First we need to create a detailed description of the virtual experiment topology by defining the experiment script, using an extension of the Network Simulator (NS) [15] language. The use of a formal language for experiment setup eases the recreation of a similar setting by any other researcher who wants to reproduce our results. In the experiment script we enumerate similar components as different instances of the same component type. This way, predefined system templates, e.g., a Linux server disk image, can be easily reused and automatically deployed and configured. 2) Experiments are instantiated by using the Emulab software, which automatically reserves and allocates the physical resources that are needed from the pool of available components. This procedure is called swap-in, in contrast to the termination of the experiment, which is called swap-out. 3) Furthermore, the software configures network switches in order to recreate the virtual topology by connecting experimental nodes using multiple VLANs. Finally, before the testbed is released for experimentation, the software configures packet capturing of predefined links for monitoring purposes. 4) Experiment-specific software, e.g., simulators, may be launched automatically through events defined in the NS script, or manually, by logging in to each station.
By employing an emulation-based testbed we ensure strong fidelity, repeatability, measurement accuracy and safety of the cyber layer. This approach is well-established in the field of cyber security [16] and was chosen in order to overcome the major difficulties that rise while trying to simulate how ICT components behave under attacks or failures.
Although EPIC is based on the original Emulab software several important extensions have been developed. A first extension includes support for special network devices such as Cisco routers and industrial PLCs (Programmable Logic Controllers) from ABB in addition to plain generic PCs. A second step forward is the support for experiment measurement, monitoring and visualization using custom visualizations and the advanced network monitoring server, called Zabbix [17] . Furthermore, to increase the number of experimental nodes, EPIC was extended with virtual machines (VMs). By using the free and open-source Virtual Box software, VM hosts run from two to six VMs, which contributes to a significant increase in EPIC's experimentation capabilities. Finally, we have integrated into EPIC power controllers (for real and virtual nodes), which enable automated power cycling of experimental nodes.
The installation of EPIC at the Joint Research Centre consists today of 160 PCs and approximately 170 virtual machines which are massively interconnected with two stacks of networks switches. In addition carrier-grade routers and industrial control hardware and software are available as experimental resources.
B. PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
For the physical layer EPIC uses simulation, since this provides an efficient, safe and low-cost approach with fast and accurate analysis capabilities. Although it weakens the fidelity requirement, software simulation enables disruptive experiments on multiple heterogeneous physical processes, satisfying at the same time all other testbed requirements, e.g., repeatability, measurement accuracy and safety. Furthermore, today we can find complex models of several physical systems in the literature. By integrating them in software simulators the behavior of real physical systems can be accurately reproduced. A clear example of the accuracy and reliability of these simulations comes from the energy sector, where
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simulation is commonly used to aid transmission system operators for decision making.
In EPIC we use generic PCs with multitasking OSs to run the real-time software simulation units. Our choice to use Simulink Coder to produce the simulators, although it has major advantages, imposes several constraints to the simulated models. An important aspect in this sense is the choice of the model execution rate, also known as the simulation step. The model's internal dynamics limit the range of possible simulation steps. Before choosing the simulation step the researcher needs to verify that the output of real-time simulation reproduces as accurately as possible the real-world process. In parallel, the model execution time on a specific computer is limited by the model's complexity and by the host's processing power. As a general rule we can state that if the model's execution time exceeds its simulation step, realtime simulation is not possible. Figure 1 (b) provides an overview of the available software units that recreate physical systems within EPIC. Physical process models were initially built in Matlab Simulink, and then the corresponding 'C' code was generated using Simulink Coder. The generated code was then integrated in the software simulation unit (SSim) in order to enable real-time interaction of simulated processes with the rest of the testbed.
At its core, the SSim unit provides the ''glue'' between the cyber and physical layers. From the SSim's perspective models are ''black-boxes'' with inputs and outputs dynamically mapped to an internal memory region. Values written into this region are copied to the model's inputs, while model outputs are copied back to the internal memory.
Currently, EPIC supports experimentation with a wide range of physical process models. Typical examples of smallscale processes are the Bell and Åström's oil-fired 160MW electric power plant [18] , which is based on the Sydsvenska Kraft AB plant in Malmö, Sweden, and the TennesseeEastman chemical process [19] , which is also based on a real process, but the authors have introduced slight changes in order to protect the identity of reactants and products. EPIC supports also larger models such as railway systems, based on the train models proposed by Rios and Ramos [20] . These take into account several aspects of real transportation systems such as weight, speed, acceleration, deceleration, and power consumption. Moreover, EPIC supports simulation of a wide range of power grid systems from the IEEE suite of power grid case systems [21] . Examples are the 9-bus test case, which is the Western System Coordinating Council's (WSCC) 3-machine 9-bus system, and the 30-bus, 39-bus and 118-bus test cases.
C. COMMUNICATION
EPIC can efficiently recreate realistic network topologies and conditions, e.g., delay and loss characteristics of Wide Area Network -WAN links, of the Internet infrastructure. For this purpose traffic shaping and generation tools such as Dummynet, CBR from Emulab, Iperf, TCPivo, and TCPReplay have been extensively tested and integrated in EPIC. Additionally, users can recreate realistic background traffic from network traces taken from the DATCAT [22] and PREDICT [23] repositories with the tool TCPivo, which has been proven to produce repeatable results [6] .
EPIC supports industrial protocols through Proxy units that translate calls between SSim and other units such as SCADA servers found in industrial installations. In their current implementation Proxy units implement Modbus as the basic communications protocol. Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS) protocols are used to communicate between industrial Human Machine Interface (HMI) software and PLCs from ABB.
To enable interdependency studies on multiple NCIs, SSim implements a Remote Procedure Call (RPC) interface which is accessible from other SSim instances. RPC calls provide access to the internal memory region and consequently to the model's inputs and outputs. This way real-time interactions between different models is supported.
D. CONTROL LOGIC
The testbed provides currently various options to recreate the control logic found in industrial installations and specifically using simulated, emulated and real implementations. The control logic found in central control centers is best recreated using real industrial HMI software from ABB. The HMI monitors the physical process and forwards operator commands to control devices. A simulation-based approach for testing operational decisions is also available through the SSim unit.
At the hardware control level the testbed includes real PLCs as well as the possibility to run emulated control code in real-time. The execution engine for emulated control code is embedded into the Proxy unit. Control code is provided in the form of an external binary, which is loaded and executed at run-time. The emulated control code can interact with SSim units, i.e., with physical processes, through Modbus or RPC calls. Additionally, the testbed supports the execution of control code by the SSim unit, which eliminates communication delays between controllers and the physical process simulator.
IV. PERFORMANCE TESTS
We have performed several performance tests in order to illustrate the advantages and possible limitations of EPIC. In this section we present the results of these experiments, which include the execution time of various physical process models and the evaluation of several important features: fidelity, repeatability, and measurement accuracy.
A. SOFTWARE SIMULATION IN EPIC
To test the strength and possible limitations of software simulation in EPIC we experimented with several physical processes. As shown in Figure 2 , despite the constraints mentioned in the previous section, Simulink Coder can be employed to experiment with a wide range of physical process models available in the literature. Our tests involved power plants, e.g., Bell and Åström's oil-fired power plant [18] , chemical plants, e.g., Tennessee-Eastman [19] , railway systems, e.g., a railway of 10 train models based on the work of Ríos and Ramos [20] , and power grid models from the well-known suite of standard IEEE models [21] , e.g., the IEEE 39 bus New England system.
The results in Figure 2 show that real-time software simulation is well suited for small and medium-scale models. Here we can see that EPIC is able to run complex chemical processes including more than 50 differential equations in 0.27ms, but also large-scale power grid models including 10 generators, such as the IEEE 39 bus system, in 7.12ms. However, software simulation is limited by the CPU speed and the size of the model. For instance, the IEEE 118 bus system is a complex model that includes 54 generators with frequency of 50Hz. The internal dynamics of this model limit the simulation step to a maximum-allowed value of approximately 24ms. Since the model's execution time on a 2.8GHz CPU is 155ms, the maximum allowed simulation step is exceeded and thus real-time simulation is not possible in this case. This is in fact a major limitation of real-time software simulation, but it can be addressed in several ways. For instance, we might leverage parallel processing techniques that are already available in Simulink. If the model can be properly structured, then Simulink generates code that executes on multiple cores even on a non real-time OS. Another approach could be to use emerging parallel processing techniques such as GPU computing. In contrast, a more effective approach is to use dedicated hardware simulators that are more powerful and specifically designed for simulations. However, these are still very expensive, e.g., the cost of a small power grid hardware simulator might exceed one hundred thousand EUR, and in a multi-model environment they could render the cost of the cyber-physical testbed staggering.
B. TESTING THE MAIN FEATURES OF EPIC
We continue the evaluation of EPIC by testing its main features: fidelity, repeatability and measurement accuracy. The study is based on a 100Mbps Ethernet LAN with three user nodes, one of them connected at 10Mbps. Emulab allocates delay-nodes running Dummynet [24] in order to model the topology (Figure 3a) . Dummynet gets configured with two pipes, one inbound and one outbound, to shape traffic entering and leaving a user node. In the following experiments, unless stated otherwise, inbound and outbound pipes have a queue size of 5 and 50 slots respectively. Physically, all interfaces in the testbed are configured at 1Gbps and it is left up to Dummynet to shape the traffic at the desired speed. In some cases we need a reference to compare our results with, therefore, we have configured the same logical topology in a real environment, i.e., three nodes connected to a Cisco switch in the same VLAN and with interfaces speed according to the emulated topology (Figure 3b) . In the implemented experiments every node is of the same type in order to avoid that results are altered due to hardware dependencies. They are Dell PCs with AMD 2GHz Athlon processor and 2GB RAM, running FreeBSD. We have used different tools and approaches to collect and to analyze experimental data: Iperf, the CBR traffic generator that comes with Emulab, TCPDump and the ''SPAN'' or ''monitor'' feature of Cisco switches together with TCPDump.
1) FIDELITY
First, we have studied the fidelity of our testbed in terms of performance and shaping accuracy. In order to study the performance, i.e., received traffic by the sink node versus sent traffic by the source node, of 100Mbps and 10Mbps LAN emulation, we generate UDP traffic with Iperf from node3 to both node4 and node5. We run multiple experiments, varying the packet size from 64 up to 1408 bytes of user data, and the generated bandwidth from 0Mbps up to the interface speed. Figures 4 and 5 depict the experienced network performance of the reference scenario and the emulated one. Ideally, we have a diagonal straight line (y = x) reaching up to the interface speed, when it becomes horizontal. In the real scenario the behavior is close to the ideal one, at least for packets larger than 256 bytes. Even in the worst case, 64 bytes packets, the performance reaches 80% of the interface speed. Above this point, the switch is not able to handle all the packets and there are drops before reaching the maximum speed.
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Conversely, if we look at the emulated scenario, we can see that the performance depends very much on the packet size, specially in the 100Mbps case. However, we still see the same behavior, for each packet size the performance follows the y = x line up to a saturation point, then it becomes horizontal. In the 10Mbps case the situation is better, the performance reaches the interface speed for packets larger than 128 bytes. This is an expected result because the smaller the packet is, the higher the number of generated packets, given a fixed bandwidth. This implies that the testbed's hardware/software components have to handle more packets and they reach the processing limit earlier. Based on these results, we are able to confirm that experimentation with Emulab provides realistic results in terms of trend and behavior. Obviously, we cannot compare the results in absolute terms because the values of our metric are very hardware-dependent.
On the other hand, there are two main configuration parameters in Dummynet which affect its task as a traffic shaper, namely queue size and delay. We have studied how accurately Dummynet can shape the desired bandwidth in relation with these two parameters.
We launched a set of experiments where we generated more than 140Mbps of CBR traffic with large packets from node3 to both node4 and node5 with different inbound queue sizes. Figure 6 shows the results for 100Mbps and 10Mbps shaping, where each pulse corresponds to a different inbound queue size, from 1 to 15 slots. The first curve (dashed line) depicts the traffic leaving node3, the second one (dotted line) corresponds to traffic leaving delaynode0, where the outbound 100Mbps interface for node3 is modeled, and the third and fourth ones (solid and starred lines) show traffic leaving delaynode1 or delaynode2, where the inbound speed is modeled for the sink nodes.
The results of the emulated configuration show that there is a clear impact of the queue size in the shaping accuracy for the 100Mbps case, where the queue size has to be 11 slots or larger to reach the desired speed. On the contrary, for the VOLUME 1, NO. 2, DECEMBER 2013 10Mbps case, this speed is already reached with 2 slots in the queue. However, configuring a higher queue size might increase the network delay. 
2) REPEATABILITY
Scientifically rigorous experimentation does not only mean to get realistic results, but being able to reproduce them at any time. Therefore, we have carried out appropriate tests to study this characteristic. We ran 40 times a specific experiment as the ones used in the fidelity analysis. We fixed all parameters and hardware to be always the same, while swapping in and out each experiment. After analyzing the experiments we observed that all the measured statistics, such as bytes, packets and drops in every node, have a coefficient of variation CV = σ µ < 0.5%. However, we have noticed that this coefficient changes significantly when free node allocation is allowed in Emulab and the nodes are not of the same characteristics.
3) MEASUREMENT ACCURACY AND INTERFERENCE
In order to test the measurement accuracy provided by different tools within EPIC, we ran a single experiment where we generated traffic with Iperf from the source node3 to both sink nodes, node4 and node5. We gathered the traffic statistics provided by different tools (Dummynet, Iperf, TCPDump) and compared them to the measurements that were yielded by spanning network traffic to a dedicated measurement node. The result was that all the tools provided exactly the same information.
In the next step we tested the measurement interference, since it is well known that measuring any parameter in a system may interfere and change its behavior [25] . We have already seen that some results are hardware dependent, so adding monitoring processes to the nodes, such as TCPDump, can interfere with the system's behavior. In order to study whether this interference is significant or not, we have compared the packet loss provided by Iperf when TCPDump is running and when it is not in the delaynodes.
As depicted in Table 2 , although we measured a slight increase in the packet loss when TCPDump is running, if we do a statistical analysis and we consider the results from the repeatability experiments, part of the variability is attributed to statistical variation. The measured standard deviations σ for packet loss were 0.146 and 0.014 for the cases of 100Mbps and 10Mbps respectively. With the exception of the three smaller packet sizes, almost all the values are within twice the standard deviation. Therefore, at least in these cases, the differences we observe might be due to statistical variation of the results, rather than the interference of TCPDump. In fact, if we look at Table 2 , only for 64bytes and 128bytes of packet sizes it is higher than the standard deviation. 
V. TYPICAL EXPERIMENTS
Since 2009, EPIC has been used concurrently by many researchers for developing, testing, and validating a wide range of concepts, prototypes and tools. In this section we briefly present a selection of three experimental scenarios involving physical processes from several domains. Although these represent only a small fraction of the numerous studies in which EPIC proved its value as a modern scientific instrument, they provide valuable insights into the disruptive effect of cyber attacks on physical processes. Additional information on different experimental scenarios is available on EPIC's official Web page (http://ipsc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/?id=693).
A. IMPACT OF PACKET FORGING ATTACK ON THE OPERATION OF A POWER PLANT
This scenario assumes that the attacker is able to access the internal network of a power plant. Then, due to the lack of authentication requirements he sends specially forged Modbus commands to PLCs, which trigger the closure of control valves and increase the pressure within the process to a critical level. The main goal of this experiment is to show that an attacker can exploit particular aspects of physical processes, e.g., a difference between the opening and closing speed of control valves, to his own benefit. However, we also show that changes in the scheduling rate of control code can limit the impact of such attacks.
The physical process used within this scenario is the Boiling Water Power Plant (BWPP) model developed by Bell and Åström in [18] . Its operation is controlled by three valves: fuel valve, steam valve, and feed-water valve. Operators monitor the process by reading three sensors: steam pressure, water level, and generated electricity. The experiment setup (shown in Figure 7 ) includes three controllers (implemented as Proxy units), each one controlling a separate valve. Control code was implemented to ensure the stability of the process by keeping valves in certain positions. The model includes the motion speed for each control valve, which is an important aspect since the attacker can exploit the difference between the opening and closing speed of a particular valve. First, we assumed that the control code is scheduled to run once every 100ms. As shown in Figure 8 (a) and Figure 8(b) , during the 10 minute period while the experiment is running, most of the times the attacker is able to keep the steam and feed-water valves in a closed position. Although the legitimate control code is able to open valves every time it runs, the attacker's commands trigger the re-closure of valves. As a result, the pressure in the boiler unit increases above 600 kg/cm 2 , which exceeds more than three times the normal operating pressure, i.e., 180 kg/cm 2 . In reality the increase in the pressure should be noticed by operators well-before it exceeded 250 kg/cm 2 and it would result in alarms and emergency shut-down of the process.
By changing our previous hypothesis and assuming that the control code runs every 1ms, we notice an impressive change on valve positions that have the same speed for opening and closing (see Figure 8(d) ). However, since the steam valve closes much faster than it opens, the attacker is able to close it, as shown in Figure 8 (c). In this case the pressure reaches only 240 kg/cm 2 after 10 minutes. Additional details and results related to this experiment can be found in [26] .
B. IMPACT OF CONTROL CODE REWRITING ATTACK ON THE OPERATION OF A CHEMICAL PROCESS
The second scenario involves a more powerful adversary, who is capable to reprogram PLCs with malicious code in order to cause damages to the physical process. The attack resembles Stuxnet's ability to rewrite control code and to run a specially crafted control logic.
The physical process for this scenario is the TennesseeEastman (TE) chemical process [19] . The TE process is a well-known system in the automation and process control community mainly because it represents a hypothetical chemical plant that is very similar to an actual plant. The TE chemical plant is a process with 41 measured parameters, 11 manipulated variables, and 11 control loops. In this use case we assume that the plant is controlled by 11 PLCs (implemented as 11 Proxy Units), that implement the base control strategy proposed by Sozio [27] . We assume that the attacker compromises a subset of three PLCs, which are capable to bring the process into a critical state. The experiment setup is illustrated in Figure 9 . The operation of the chemical process for 40h without any disturbances is shown in Figure 10 (a) and Figure 10(b) . The control loops are necessary to keep the process in a steadystate, since without them process parameters would reach their shut down limits after approximately 3.6h [27] . The attacker's ability to rewrite control logic is emulated through a script which initiates new SSH connections to the three remote stations on which emulated PLCs are running. It stops the Proxy units, downloads the new malicious binaries to be executed as control code, and then restarts the Proxy units. The malicious control code closes three control valves: the condenser, compressor and purge valves. The consequences are immediately seen in Figure 10 (c) and Figure 10(d) , where both the pressure and the temperature in the reactor unit exhibit a sudden decrease. The remaining, non-infected PLCs try to restore stability of the process and are able to increase the pressure. However, after 3.26h the pressure reaches a critical value of 3000kPa and at this point the model shuts down. Additional details on this scenario can be found in [28] .
C. IMPACT OF DDoS ATTACK ON THE OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL GRID AND RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION
The third scenario explores the consequences and the propagation of disruptions in a scenario involving three critical infrastructures: the ICT infrastructure, the power grid and the railway system. We consider the hypothetical scenario of a cyber-attack and specifically a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, that is causing a severe telecommunication service degradation which propagates across several Critical Infrastructures.
We recreated the typical architecture of an installation in which the power grid is controlled remotely (Figure 11) . Here, Site A runs a simplified model of an Energy Management System (EMS) [29] to ensure voltage stability. The EMS continuously monitors and adjusts the operational parameters of the power grid model running at Site B. In this scenario we adopted the IEEE 39-bus New England system that includes a total of 39 substations together with 10 generators. The daily load imposed to our system derives from real data [30] and the intervention of the EMS is required to keep the grid stable. In order to illustrate the propagation of disturbances to other CIs we used a simple railway system model [20] that includes 10 trains. The train model takes into account several aspects of real transportation systems such as weight, speed, acceleration and deceleration. To provide a realistic communications infrastructure between the EMS and power grid simulator we assumed that the service provider uses an MPLS (Multi Protocol Label Switching) network. MPLS is a protocol that telecom operators already use to replace older implementations based on Frame Relay and Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) [31] . Using our Emulab installation, we created a minimal MPLS network with four Cisco 6503 routers, composed of two core and two edge routers, on which we defined two MPLS Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). VPN 1 acted as a protected virtual circuit between Site A and Site B, an approach that is usually followed by telecom operators to isolate customer traffic. Since telecom operators route diverse traffic, e.g., public Internet traffic, through the same MPLS cloud, we used VPN 2 to create a virtual circuit serving public Internet between two different regions.
To explore the impact of disruptive cyber-attacks, we launched a bandwidth consumption DDoS attack in VPN 2 and measured its effect on the power grid operator's virtual circuit in VPN 1. Figure 12 (b) and 12(a) illustrate the traffic throughput in VPN 2 and VPN 1, respectively. The attack had clearly serious consequences on the grid operator's private circuit. As illustrated in Figure 12 (a) the traffic throughput dropped from an average of 150Kbit/sec to less than 10Kbit/sec (to 0Kbit/sec most of the times). Consequently, the EMS lost control over the power grid and was unable to send commands that could restore stability. As shown in Figure 12 (c), once the attack is started the grid is able to run for approximately 7 minutes without intervention. However, after 7 minutes the changes in the daily load would require an intervention of the EMS to increase or decrease the generated power. Since the commands from the EMS can not reach the physical power grid devices, i.e., the SSim unit at Site B, the voltages in the different segments of the grid begin to collapse. During normal operation trains start by increasing their speed up to a maximum value and continue with the same speed until they reach the next station. Once the attack disrupts the normal operation of the grid, sub-nominal voltage levels trigger circuit breakers and disconnect the railway system from the electricity grid. As shown in Figure 12(d) , the loss of power supply brings obviously all trains to full stop.
In reality, most telecom operators take strong measures to limit the interference between separate VPNs. For example, with the deployment of Quality of Service (QoS) in the MPLS network an attack on the public Internet hardly affects the private traffic of other telecom service customers. This claim was actually validated by running the aforementioned experiment after activating QoS in the MPLS cloud. In this case the EMS was able to communicate with the power grid simulator and keep the grid stable. The only effect that we could still measure was a slight increase of the packets Round-TripTime by 1 to 2ms. This increase is still tolerable if we consider typical network delays as well as the IEEE standard for communication delays in substation automation [32] , which states that high-speed messages must be delivered in the 2ms to 10ms range.
Nevertheless such protective measures are not compulsory, e.g., through policies and regulation. The severe risks that are involved if such protective measures are not implemented, were clearly demonstrated by our case study that highlights the potential impact of ICT disruptions on a wide range of physical systems. Additional details related to this experiment can be found in [33] .
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented EPIC, a novel testbed specifically designed for cyber security studies with multiple heterogeneous Networked Critical Infrastructures (NCIs). EPIC can be considered as an instance of a new class of scientific instruments, namely cyber-physical testbeds, that are suitable for assessing the impact of cyber-threats against physical infrastructures. By using real ICT components together with multiple interconnected simulation units, EPIC supports real-time interdependency studies which can provide insights on the propagation of faults and disruptions. EPIC's potential to recreate and assess the impact of plausible cyber-attack scenarios targeting the normal functioning of physical processes was demonstrated through several casestudies that cover ICT infrastructures, power plants, chemical plants, electricity grids and railway systems. EPIC's software simulators are available as open-source on SourceForge (http://sourceforge.net/projects/amici/).
